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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery.
1
  Similar to 
traditional slaveholders, traffickers retain complete control over the 
enslaved, who must live and work as commanded by the trafficker.
2
  
Estimates vary widely on the number of trafficking victims, but the range is 
between one and twenty-seven million people.
3
  Eighty percent of these 
victims are women.
4
 
Although there are a number of factors that “push” women from 
countries of origin and “pull” them into destination countries, the greatest 
underlying cause of trafficking in women is poverty.
5
 
In many cases, traffickers promise a better economic future and 
deceive women into accepting a fraudulent offer of employment abroad.
6
  
Once travel is underway, the trafficking situation begins.  The trafficked 
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 1. See KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING 7 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. See Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: 
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 342 (2007) (highlighting human trafficking as a 
crime that disproportionately affects women). 
 5. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 6. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 25; see also ALEXIS A. ARONOWITZ, HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING, HUMAN MISERY: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS 55 (2009) 
(“Recruitment very often involves promises of marriage (or of employment, education 
opportunities, or a better life).”). 
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woman‟s passport is taken and her wages are withheld until the debt that is 
incurred to travel to the destination country is repaid.
7
  This is an almost 
insurmountable task.
8
  Those who try to escape are severely beaten, raped, 
and even killed.
9
 
Microcredit has been lauded as a panacea to end poverty among 
women.
10
  This Comment argues that a successful microcredit program 
would substantially decrease the number of trafficked women.  By reducing 
poverty, women would be less compelled to seek economic opportunities 
elsewhere, and thus much less likely to fall prey to trafficking.  However, 
this Comment also maintains that the current microcredit system actually 
perpetuates poverty and increases the likelihood of women being 
trafficked. 
In order for microcredit to be truly successful in maximizing outreach 
to the impoverished and assisting the women most vulnerable to 
trafficking, it is essential that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide 
credit to the poorest women, allow flexibility in loan repayment, educate 
women about business and savings, address cultural and gender issues that 
challenge women in these patriarchal societies, and collaborate with local 
governments to ensure that aid reaches the poorest segment of the 
population and that corruption among government officials is eliminated. 
This Comment proceeds as follows:  Section II discusses human 
trafficking, focusing on the major underlying cause of trafficking in 
women, poverty; Section III examines what microcredit is and why it has 
been touted as a solution to eliminating poverty among women; Section IV 
highlights the limitations of microcredit that perpetuate cycles of poverty 
and increase women‟s vulnerability to trafficking; Section V discusses 
recommendations for how to improve the system by expanding access to 
credit, increasing flexibility in loan repayment, providing non-financial 
services, and maintaining an ethos of social outreach, rather than a focus on 
financial returns. 
II. TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN:  A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC 
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children defines human 
trafficking as follows: 
 
 7. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 57. 
 8. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 11 (citing McGill Int‟l Law Soc‟y, 
Conference on Human Trafficking in Canada (Mar. 20, 2006)), summarized at 
http://mils.mcgill.ca/resources/Human_Trafficking.pdf (detailing how a trafficked woman‟s 
debt can almost never be repaid because she is required to pay for her own living expenses). 
 9. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 58-59. 
 10. TAZUL ISLAM, MICROCREDIT AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION 2-3 (2007). 
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the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,  the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the  removal of organs.
11
 
This definition highlights the fact that trafficking is an epidemic that 
largely affects women and children and often involves sexual exploitation.  
It also illustrates that trafficking includes forced labor and the removal of 
organs as forms of exploitation.
12
 
Estimates vary widely on the magnitude of trafficking.  According to 
the U.S. Department of State, approximately 800,000 people are trafficked 
across national borders each year, and millions more are trafficked within 
their own country‟s borders.
13
  The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
estimates that more than twelve million people are engaged in forced labor, 
including sexual exploitation, as a result of trafficking.
14
  Others, including 
NGOs such as Free the Slaves (FTS), approximate that there are twenty-
seven million victims of trafficking.
15
  It is estimated that more than 80% of 
trafficking victims are women.
16
  70% of female victims are trafficked into 
the commercial sex industry.
17
 
The U.S. Department of State notes that the nationalities of women 
that are trafficked are, “as diverse as the world‟s cultures.”
18
  One-hundred 
sixty-one countries are involved in human trafficking either as source, 
transit, and/or destination countries.
19
  Human trafficking affects every 
 
 11. G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, Art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001). 
 12. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 9. 
 13. See U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/ (discussing the rates of human trafficking 
internationally). 
 14. See U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/ (stating that at least 12.3 million adults and 
children are engaged in forced labor and commercial sexual servitude). 
 15. See, e.g., What‟s the Story: Modern Slavery, FREE THE SLAVES, 
http://wwww.freetheslaves.net/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=375&srcid=183 (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2010) (reporting 27 million victims of human trafficking). 
 16. See Haynes, supra note 4, at 342 (illustrating how human trafficking 
disproportionately affects women). 
 17. U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 10 (2004). 
 18. U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, supra note 13, at 8. 
 19. See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), Trafficking in Persons: Global 
Patterns 17 (April 2006) (displaying a map reporting incidences of human trafficking). 
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continent and every type of economy.
20
  However, the origin countries with 
a “very high” rate of human trafficking are Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
China, Lithuania, Moldova, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Thailand, and 
Ukraine.
21
  These countries have high unemployment, poverty, civil unrest, 
and unstable political regimes that have left many women destitute and, as 
a result, high-risk targets for trafficking.
22
 
Human trafficking is the third largest international criminal enterprise, 
behind only drugs and weapons smuggling.
23 
 The United Nations estimates 
that the total market value of illicit human trafficking is $32 billion.
24
  
Approximately $10 billion is derived from the initial “sale” of the 
individual, and the rest represents the estimated profits from the activities 
or goods produced by the victims.
25
 
A. The “typical” trafficking situation 
The women who are most vulnerable to trafficking are largely from 
poor, rural countries.
26
  Traffickers send recruiters to villages and towns to 
lure financially insolvent women into accepting seemingly legitimate 
employment, modeling, or matchmaking opportunities abroad.
27
  The 
Internet is an effective tool for attracting women to foreign cities with false 
promises of employment and a better life, exacerbating this global 
epidemic.
28
 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the countries of origin of 
human trafficking). 
 22. See generally id. at 23-24 (citing poverty and gender inequality as common “push 
factors” evident in the countries in which trafficking originates). 
 23. Hanh Diep, We Pay -- The Economic Manipulation of International and Domestic 
Laws to Sustain Sex Trafficking, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT‟L L. REV. 309, 317 (2005). 
 24. UN and Partners Launching Initiative to End „Modern Slavery‟ of Human 
Trafficking, UN NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 26, 2007, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=22009&Cr=slave&Cr1=&Kw1=Initiative
&Kw2=&Kw3=. 
 25. Id. 
 26. NOELEEN HEYZER, UNIFEM, COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN: 
A GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 5 (2002), available at 
http://www.childtrafficking.org/pdf/user/unifem_gender_and_human_rights_framework.pdf
. 
 27. See AMY O‟NEILL RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF 
SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 5 (2000), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/trafficking.pdf 
(focusing on how women are duped into a trafficking situation by recruiters who set up 
seemingly legitimate employment opportunities that turn into trafficking situations). 
 28. See DONNA HUGHES, PIMPS AND PREDATORS ON THE INTERNET, GLOBALIZING THE 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN passim (1999), available at 
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/pprep.pdf (showing how the Internet has exacerbated 
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In most cases, recruiters front the money to pay for travel documents 
and transportation for these seemingly legitimate employment 
opportunities.
29
  However, once travel begins, the trafficking arrangement 
is initiated.  The victim‟s passport is taken and she is “immediately in the 
control of the trafficker.”
30
  During the transit, the trafficker continues to 
assert control over the victim through either violence or a “subtle process 
of degradation and subjugation.”
31
 
Upon reaching the destination country, the victim‟s wages are 
withheld until the debt that was incurred to travel to the destination country 
is repaid.
32
  Paying off one‟s debt bondage is almost an impossible task.  It 
is estimated that a prostituted woman would have to service between 500 
and 700 men just to pay her travel debt.
33
  According to the U.S. 
Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, “the [total] debt can 
never be repaid because the costs for food, rent, medicines and condoms 
are added every day.”
34
 
In addition to debt bondage, women are prevented from escaping by 
security guards, and are subjected to physical, mental, and sexual abuse.
35
  
Women who try to escape or cooperate with police are often met with 
severe violence.
36
  Studies have found that between one-quarter and one-
half of trafficked women seeking assistance from organizations that assist 
migrants have been severely beaten and raped by their traffickers.
37
 
B. Poverty is the major cause of trafficking in women 
The causes of trafficking in women largely stem from poverty.
38
  The 
 
the problem of trafficking of women). 
 29. O‟NEILL RICHARD, supra note 27, at 5. 
 30. KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY 145 (2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 57 (discussing how the victim of a trafficking 
situation has to repay their debt to travel to the destination country). 
 33. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 11 (citing McGill Int‟l Law Soc‟y, Conference 
on Human Trafficking in Canada (Mar. 20, 2006), summarized at 
http://mils.mcgill.ca/resources/Human_Trafficking.pdf). 
 34. U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 26 (2007), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/. 
 35. O‟NEILL RICHARD, supra note 27, at 5. 
 36. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 58 (citing JANICE C. RAYMOND & DONNA M. HUGHES, 
COAL. AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, SEX TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2001)), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/sex_traff_us.pdf 
(documenting the pervasiveness of violence in sex trafficking). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the underlying causes of 
trafficking, citing poverty as the main cause); see also SHELDON ZHANG, SMUGGLING AND 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: ALL ROADS LEAD TO AMERICA 9 (2007) (“Poverty is 
probably the most cited factor in explaining transnational migration.”). 
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majority of the world‟s poor are women.  Of the 1.3 billion people in 
poverty, 70% are women.
39
  Women perform two-thirds of the world‟s 
work, but only earn 10% of the income and own 1% of the property.
40
 
Furthermore, as developing economies globalize, many women are 
being displaced from the workforce.
41
  When the formerly communist 
countries of Eastern Europe and Russia shifted to a market economy, 
women‟s employment fell by as much as 40%.
42
   Women looked for other 
work and became easy targets for traffickers.
43
  As a result, two-thirds of 
the 500,000 victims of the sex trade in the European Union are from the 
Eastern European countries.
44
 
Moreover, most poor women are uneducated, which means that they 
have limited access to the labor market and are the first to lose their jobs in 
an economic downturn.  The United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) 
estimates that in 2008 over 100 million children of primary school age 
were out of school and 52% of them were girls.
45
  Rural girls face even 
more barriers to receiving an education due to traditional gender norms that 
discourage girls from attending school.
46
  Because women have high 
illiteracy rates and therefore fewer skills, “the cycle of poverty is 
perpetuated.”
47
  Women who try to wrestle free from this cycle by seeking 
economic opportunities elsewhere have a high risk of being trafficked.
48
 
Additionally, in many developing countries, discriminatory laws and 
practices that tie women‟s legal, economic, and property rights to men 
exacerbate the problem of women‟s poverty.
49
  For example, in some 
cultures, new widows must follow strict mourning practices, including a 
 
 39. Sylvia Chant, The „Feminisation of Poverty‟ and the „Feminisation‟ of Anti-Poverty 
Programmes: Room for Revision?, 44 J. OF DEV. STUD. 165, 166-67 (2008). 
 40. Gender Equality, UNICEF, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/gender/index_bigpicture.html (last updated Aug. 25, 2004). 
 41. See Nilanjana Ray, Looking at Trafficking Through a New Lens, 12 CARDOZO J.L. 
& GENDER 909, 925-26 (2005-06) (discussing the impact that the shift from an agricultural 
society to a market economy has increased the rates of unemployment and poverty among 
women). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Diane Fahey, Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking, 40 GEO. J. INT‟L L. 345, 352 
(2009). 
 45. UNICEF, PROGRESS FOR CHILDREN 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Progress_for_Children-No.9_EN_081710.pdf. 
 46. Fahey, supra note 44, at 353; see also UNICEF, supra note 45, at 18 (“86% of 
urban children attend primary school, compared to only 72% of rural children.”). 
 47. Id. at 354. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Democracy and Global Affairs, Gender Imbalance in Human Trafficking, U.S. 
DEP‟T OF STATE (June 15, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126792.pdf 
(noting that vulnerabilities to trafficking result from economic, political, and developmental 
processes that can leave women dependent on men). 
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month of isolation.
50
  During this time of isolation, inheritance laws allow 
the relatives of a deceased man to confiscate the man‟s property from the 
widow and her children.
51
  In many cases, the widow may not withdraw 
money from her bank account or take a job during this time.
52
  When the 
woman is left in extreme poverty with children to take care of, she is 
willing to accept almost any economic opportunity, increasing the chances 
that she will become a victim of trafficking.
53
 
Finally, women living in poverty are often made more vulnerable to 
trafficking by their own country‟s local government.
54
  Some governments 
have refused to fight trafficking or have even encouraged it because the 
local community can profit economically from the trafficking.
55
  
Traffickers spend money in the community where they hold their victims, 
injecting capital into local businesses and infusing the local economy.
56
  
For example, a United Nations study examining the trafficking of Filipinos 
to Malaysia found that senior police officers that cooperated with the 
traffickers were given financial incentives and free access to the sexual 
services of the trafficked women.
57
  Corruption is an important component 
of trafficking operations and continues to exacerbate the trafficking 
epidemic. 
III. WHAT IS MICROCREDIT AND HOW CAN IT ALLEVIATE POVERTY AND 
DETER TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN? 
Microcredit has been recognized as a “financial instrument and a tool 
of poverty reduction.”
58
  If microcredit can succeed in providing poor 
 
 50. See id. (discussing the disproportionate numbers of females forced into the sex 
trade, as opposed to males). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing how inheritance laws limit a 
widow‟s opportunities to survive economically and increase the chance that she will be 
desperate to take on any employment opportunity available such as entering into a 
trafficking situation). 
 54. See Fahey, supra note 44, at 347 (citing government corruption as the lead cause in 
human trafficking). 
 55. Id. at 354. 
 56. See Kevin Bales, International Labor Standards: Quality of Information and 
Measures of Progress in Combating Forced Labor, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 330 
(2003) (explaining that government corruption is a significant factor contributing to the high 
rates of trafficking in women). 
 57. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 62 (citing Wong and Saat, Coalition Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings in the Philippines: Country Report on Malaysia/Sabah, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Bangi (2002) (unpublished report submitted to the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute)). 
 58. Sana Khan, Poverty Reduction Efforts: Does Microcredit Help? SAIS REV. INT‟L 
AFF 147 (Summer-Fall 2009). 
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women with enough financial stability that they are not burdened to seek a 
better life elsewhere, it would be instrumental in decreasing rates of 
trafficking in women.  However, it is argued in this Comment that the 
current microcredit system perpetuates poverty and increases women‟s 
susceptibility to trafficking.  Before discussing the limitations of 
microcredit, providing a historical overview of the development of 
microcredit will be helpful to gain a more complete picture of what 
microcredit is and what it does (and does not do) for alleviating poverty 
and instances of trafficking in women. 
A. What is microcredit? 
Microcredit is defined as the extension of small, short-term loans to 
the very poor who lack the traditional physical collateral that large 
institutional lenders typically require.
59
  The United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) states that its goal in extending microcredit 
is “to create income and employment in poor communities through 
development of local microenterprises and, in the process, increase the 
financial well-being of borrowers, their families, and the community at 
large.”
60
 
Typical microcredit activities include food production and sale, 
handicraft production, repair services, and making clothes.
61
  Instead of 
relying on local moneylenders who often charge between 100 to 200% 
interest on loans,
62
 poor rural families can use microcredit to meet capital 
expenditures, including the purchasing of bullocks, carts, agricultural tools, 
and other equipment necessary to operate their businesses.
63
 
B. The history of microcredit 
Professor Muhammad Yunus is often cited as the pioneer of 
 
 59. See Documents and Reports, So, What is "Microcredit"??, GLOBAL DEV. RES. 
CENTER, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/what-is-ms.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2009) (discussing 
the basic structure and function of microcredit). 
 60. U.N. CAPITAL DEV. FUND (UNCDF), MICROSTART: A GUIDE FOR PLANNING, 
STARTING AND MANAGING A MICROFINANCE PROGRAMME 4-10 (1997), available at 
http://www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/uploads/thematic/MicroStartGuide-1997.pdf. 
 61. See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN‟S FUND (UNICEF), GIVE US CREDIT 6, (1997), 
available at http://www.unicef.org/credit/credit.pdf (discussing the typical types of business 
that microloans fund). 
 62. Aminur Rahman, Rhetoric and Realities of Micro-Credit for Women in Rural 
Bangladesh: A Village Study of Grameen Bank Lending (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Manitoba) (1998) at 172. 
 63. See Jamil Chowdhury, Reintegration of Internally Displaced People (IDPS): The 
Need for Micro-Credit, 19 REFUGEE SURV. Q., No. 2, 2000 at 201 (stating that the 
microloans are often used to purchase equipment to operate their business). 
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microcredit.
64
  Yunus started the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1976 
with a $30 loan to a group of forty-two basket weavers.
65
  Grameen 
currently has disbursed more than $5 billion in credit to more than 5.3 
million clients in more than 57,790 of Bangladesh‟s 68,000 villages.
66
  
Women comprise 97% of Grameen's borrowers.
67
  Grameen reports high 
loan repayment rates, averaging between 95-98%.
68
 
The Grameen system is a group-based lending model in which 
borrowers organize themselves into groups of five.  The group receives one 
loan and it must decide which member will receive the loan first.
69
  The 
average loan is $388 and interest rates are approximately 20%.
70
  The 
individual who receives the loan is responsible for loan repayments but the 
group works together to make sure that all loans are repaid on time so that 
the other group members will be able to receive credit in the future.
71
 
The Grameen system requires rigorous field supervision and weekly 
repayment schedules.
72
  The group members must meet every week to 
make interest and loan payments and to review each other's business plans.  
When the loan is repaid, another member is able to borrow.  Although the 
bank monitors the group closely, the incentive structure of the microloan 
also encourages peer monitoring.
73
  In sum, “the physical collateral 
requirement is replaced by the peer group's pressure for the borrower to 
repay.”
74
  This social collateral has been successful in ensuring that loans 
are repaid on time.
75
  However, as will be discussed in a later Section, these 
high repayment statistics mask the immense pressure that is placed on 
 
 64. SAMIRENDRA NATH DHAR, MICRO-FINANCE FOR WOMEN, 16 (2005). 
 65. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 82-83 (discussing the history of the Grameen system). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Introduction, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=112 (last visited Oct. 
7, 2010). 
 68. Microfinance Basics, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what-
we-do/microfinance/microfinance-basics (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 69. See Lisa Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of Conflict: Rebuilding the 
Lives and Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL'Y 205, 221 (2005) (discussing the structure of the Grameen system). 
 70. Grameen Bank at a Glance, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Oct. 
12, 2010). 
 71. What is Microfinance, Why Is Microfinance Successful?, WOKAI, 
http://www.wokai.org/microfinance (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 72. See Chowdhury, supra note 63, at 201 (examining the structure of the Grameen 
system and the multitude of requirements that must be met to secure the loan, including 
weekly meetings and repayments). 
 73. Alexandra Bernasek, Banking on Social Change: Grameen Bank Lending to 
Women, 16 INT‟L J. POL. CULTURE, & SOC‟Y 369, 372 (2003). 
 74. Avery, supra note 69, at 222. 
 75. Bernasek, supra note 73, at 372. 
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borrowers to make loan repayments.  Many borrowers are pushed to take 
out additional loans from local lenders at high interest rates to meet the 
initial payments on the microloan.
76
  They also seek economic 
opportunities elsewhere and, as a result, have a high risk of being lured into 
seemingly legitimate employment positions that operate as a guise for 
trafficking.
77
 
C. The development of microcredit since Grameen Bank 
Since the inception of the Grameen Bank, both the United States and 
the international community have responded to the “success” of the 
Grameen Bank microcredit system by funding their own Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) with the intention of decreasing poverty among women.   
The United States has funded a plethora of international microcredit 
programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  USAID is the world's leading donor for microcredit programs, 
providing over $259 million in microloans in sixty-nine countries.
78
  
USAID reports that many of these microloans are based upon a group-
lending model similar to the Grameen system and that its overall repayment 
rate exceeds 95%.
79
 
One of the largest microcredit group-lending programs funded by 
USAID is the Foundation for International Community Assistance 
(FINCA).
80
  FINCA, which started in 1985 with 200 borrowers in Costa 
Rica, has disbursed over $136 million to more than 220,000 clients in 
twenty countries in Africa, Asia, and North and South America by 2002.
81
  
FINCA is structured much like the Grameen system, offering microloans to 
groups of ten to fifty people, mostly women, in which all members assume 
the personal responsibility of guaranteeing the loans of each of its 
members, and reports a 97% repayment rate.
82
 
 
 76. See Rahman, supra note 62, at 5 (noting the high interest rates charged by local 
moneylenders). 
 77. CULLEN-DU PONT, supra note 1, at 25. 
 78. USAID, MICROENTERPRISE RESULTS REPORTING, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2009), available at  
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=40534_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
 79. See e.g., Press Release, USAID, USAID Program In Iraq Tops $150 Million in 
Microloans (Mar. 25 2008), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2008/pr080325.html (announcing the disbursement of 
microloans to small groups of people in Iraq and noting the high repayment rate). 
 80. See FINCA‟s History, FOUND. FOR INT‟L COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE (FINCA), 
http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2604291/k.99B5/FINCAs_History.ht
m (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (describing why FINCA was created and how it has evolved 
over time). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Frequently Asked Questions, FINCA, 
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D. The success of microcredit 
The Microcredit Summit Campaign, a global coalition of 
microlenders, estimates that as of 2006, over 3,100 MFIs were providing 
financial services to more than 113 million people worldwide.
83
  Over 
eighty-one million of these clients lived on less than $1 a day when they 
took their first loan.
84
  Of these poorest clients, 84% were women.
85
  
Women have been successful in paying back microloans, with most MFIs 
achieving loan repayment rates upwards of 95%.
86
 
Studies also demonstrate that microcredit programs have increased 
poor women‟s economic opportunities.
87
  Some argue that microcredit has 
empowered women by “putting capital in their hands and allowing them to 
earn an independent income and contribute financially to their households 
and communities.”
88
  In addition, borrowers‟ children, particularly female 
children, have “higher rates of enrollment in school, and borrowers tend to 
be more attentive to the medical needs of their children.”
89
 
 Microcredit has been lauded as a tool for eradicating poverty.
90
  In 
2000, the U.S. passed legislation implementing microcredit programs to 
prevent and deter trafficking in women.
91
  The United Nations declared 
2005 to be the “International Year of Microcredit,” in an effort to help poor 
countries reach economic sustainability through microcredit.
92
  In 2006, Dr. 
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, won the Nobel 
Peace Prize.
93
  This recognition has “helped microfinance emerge at the 
forefront of a number of international campaigns designed to alleviate 
 
http://www.finca.org/site/c.6fIGIXMFJnJ0H/b.6088223/k.802B/Frequently_Asked_Questio
ns.htm#vbank (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (discussing microcredit generally and specifically 
how the Village Banking system that FINCA has created functions). 
 83. SAM DALEY-HARRIS, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN 18 (2006). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. About Microfinance, DIGNITY FUND, http://www.dignityfund.com/about_mf.html 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 87. See generally UNICEF, supra note 61, at 3 (“[Microcredit] is a way of improving 
the earning capacity and therefore the standard of living of the poor.”). 
 88. SUSY CHESTON & LISA KUHN, UNIFEM, EMPOWERING WOMEN THROUGH 
MICROFINANCE 14, available at www.microcreditsummit.org/papers/empowerment.pdf. 
 89. See Avery, supra note 69, at 209 (citing UNICEF, supra note 61, at 6). 
 90. Khan, supra note 58, at 148. 
 91. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 §106, 22 U.S.C. § 7104 
(2006). “The President shall establish and carry out international initiatives to enhance 
economic opportunity for potential victims of trafficking as a method to deter trafficking.  
Such initiatives may include (1) microcredit lending programs, training in business 
development, skills training, and job counseling. . . .”  Id. 
 92. Khan, supra note 58, at 148. 
 93. Id. 
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poverty.”
 94
  However, as will be discussed in the next Section, there is an 
ongoing debate as to whether microcredit reaches the poorest of the poor 
and whether it is a “genuinely effective tool for poverty reduction.”
95
 
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF MICROCREDIT IN DECREASING THE RATES OF 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN 
In spite of the impressive statistics on the number of women who have 
received microloans and the high rate of loan repayment, the literature 
suggests that microcredit has a limited impact on poverty alleviation.
96
  
Furthermore, the rates of human trafficking remain exceedingly high.
97
  
Therefore, the shortcomings of microcredit must be identified and reforms 
made to the system in order for it to serve as an effective economic means 
of deterring trafficking in women. 
This Section will highlight the current limitations of microcredit.  
First, microloans fail to reach the poorest women who are at the highest 
risk of entering into a trafficking situation.
98
  Second, the rigid microloan 
structure requires immediate repayment at high interest rates,
99
 not only 
perpetuating the cycle of poverty, but also increasing the likelihood that 
women will seek seemingly legitimate economic opportunities outside of 
their respective home countries to make loan repayments.  Finally, there are 
cultural and gender issues that must be addressed for microcredit to be 
successful in decreasing trafficking, specifically the fact that many women 
lose control of how the loan is used to male members of the household but 
still retain liability for repayment.
100
  Women borrowers have also 
experienced verbal and physical abuse for their involvement with 
microloans.
101
 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 147. 
 97. Elizabeth M. Wheaton et al., Economics of  Human Trafficking, INT‟L MIGRATION, 
Aug. 2010, at 114, 114 (“Within the next 10 years, crime experts expect human trafficking 
to surpass drug and arms trafficking in its incidence, cost to human wellbeing, and 
profitability to criminals.”). 
 98. Celia Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 327 (2002). 
 99. Avery, supra note 69, at 229. 
 100. Anne Marie Goetz & Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power and 
Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 45, 49 
(1996). 
 101. Rahman, supra note 62, at 158. 
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A. Microloans do not reach the poorest women most vulnerable to 
trafficking 
According to the 2008 Microfinance India State of the Sector Report 
(MISS), poverty audits reveal that, “in five out of eight [MFIs], the 
proportion of non-poor clients‟ [(income more than $1 per day)] was more 
than poor [clients‟ (income less than $1 per day)], with coverage of non-
poor ranging from 42 to 88[%] of the clientele.”
102
  In fact, MFIs seem to 
be excluding the poorest segment and focusing mostly on the non-poor 
group.
103
  This is likely due to the fact that many MFIs rely on external 
donors for funds and are pressured to produce instantaneous results.
104
 
Additionally, MFIs fail to reach the poorest segment of the population 
because the rural poor are often dispersed geographically, making it 
difficult to form groups.
105
  This group often requires smaller deposits and 
loans, in a “context where poor physical infrastructure and increased 
lending risk due to poorly diversified livelihoods and economics impose 
higher costs on providers.”
106
  These factors make poor, rural women less 
ideal candidates for microloans than their slightly wealthier counterparts.
107
 
 Furthermore, many MFIs select clients based on existing cash flows.  
The cash flow combined with the joint liability of the group-lending model, 
“acts as soft collateral against unwilling default.”
108
  As a result, in India, 
requiring an existing cash flow excludes 36% of Indians who live on less 
than $1 a day.
109
  This statistic indicates that the extremely poor women 
who have the highest risk of becoming victims of trafficking are not being 
served by microcredit. 
Some scholars argue that it is simply impossible to provide 
microcredit to the poorest of the poor, because it would not be financially 
sustainable for the MFIs.
110
  MFIs need to maintain a balance between 
outreach and sustainability, that is, the “balance between its social mission 
 
 102. Gautam Aggarwal & Saikat Podder, Microfinance: Treading a Fine Line Between 
Financial and Social Objectives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126093830654793317.html. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Taylor, supra note 98, at 328. 
 105. Id. at 329. 
 106. Susan Johnson & Namrata Sharma, „Institutionalizing Suspicion‟: The Management 
and Governance Challenge in User-Owned Microfinance Groups, in WHAT‟S WRONG WITH 
MICROFINANCE?, 61, 63 (Thomas Dichter & Malcolm Harper eds., 2007). 
 107. Id. at 61, 63. 
 108. Aggarwal & Podder, supra note 102. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 159 (“In considering the sustainability of the poverty 
alleviation impact of the GB microfinance program[s] . . . it can safely be said that in terms 
of consumption smoothing its performance is good but in terms of significant poverty 
alleviation, the performance is not encouraging.”). 
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of poverty alleviation and its commercial strategy of sustainability.”
111
  
There has been an increase in the number of profit-oriented financial 
institutions invested in MFIs, including Citigroup, Barclays and JP 
Morgan.
112
  Commentators assert that this has “further led to dilution of 
social objectives of MFIs, transforming them primarily into commercial 
enterprises.”
113
  Fixating on financial sustainability has pushed MFIs to 
focus on “easy-to-serve” and “relatively better-off populations”
114
 rather 
than the rural poor, who are the most in need of financial assistance and 
also the most susceptible to trafficking.  Carlos Labarthe, one of the CEOs 
of Compartamos, a Mexican microfinance institution that generates a profit 
of $80 million a year by serving one million women with microcredit at 
90% interest rates, summed up the current view of many MFIs in his 
statement that microcredit is, “in a way creating wealth, more than wiping 
out of poverty.  Not bringing up the destitute.”
115
 
This concentration on financial rather than social returns
116
 is 
troubling, and suggests that many MFIs will not reach out to the poorest 
segments of society and offer them flexible financial services because it is 
not profitable.  While it may be impossible for MFIs to reach all poor 
women, in order for microcredit to be effective in curtailing the rates of 
trafficking, the focus needs to be on maximizing outreach to the abject poor 
rather than succeeding as a traditional financial institution.
117
 
B. Pressure to make immediate loan repayments at high interest rates 
perpetuates poverty and can increase rates of trafficking 
Women who are successful in obtaining a microloan must then 
grapple with the tremendous pressure of making loan payments, 
particularly under the group-lending structure where another group 
member‟s future credit hinges on the success of the member currently 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. ANANYA ROY, POVERTY CAPITAL: MICROFINANCE AND THE MAKING OF 
DEVELOPMENT 31 (2010). 
 113. Aggarwal & Podder, supra note 102. 
 114. Johnson & Sharma, supra note 106, at 70. 
 115. ROY, supra note 112, at 27 (citing Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, THE NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 30 2006, at 62, available at 
www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030fa_fact1). 
 116. ROY, supra note 112, at 26. 
 117. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 162-63 (“In considering the trade-off between poverty 
alleviation and sustainability, it is emphasized that as the GB is the product of some 
desperate economic situations . . . it is more of a poverty alleviation organization than just a 
traditional commercial financial institution.  The main objective of poverty alleviation is the 
end, to which the GB should try to reach with its means of a sustainable financial structure . 
. . .”). 
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borrowing.
118
  The fact that many MFIs require immediate loan repayment 
at interest rates upwards of 20%
119
 increases the pressure that these women 
face.  As a result, many borrow money from local moneylenders or seek 
additional economic prospects to ensure that they can make timely 
payments.
120
  Scholars argue that microcredit programs that are based on 
group lending, “„promote[] unprecedented levels of indebtedness [and] that 
the low default figures mask unprecedented misery.‟”
121
  The rigid 
microloan structure places women further in debt and increases their 
susceptibility to trafficking. 
For most microenterprises, it takes about three months for income to 
be earned from the microloan.
122
  However, the weekly loan-repayment 
requirement forces borrowers to invest in projects that are expected to 
generate immediate income.
123
  For example, a borrower is forced to spend 
more money on a dairy cow, which can produce milk from the first week, 
rather than a calf, which is a cheaper and better long-term investment but 
will not yield immediate results.
124
 
Scholars have also found that many women who receive microloans 
initially use the loan for household consumption, including food and 
medicine, instead of an activity that will generate immediate profit.
125
  One 
study reported that 78% of microloans approved for specific projects were 
actually used for other economic activities or to meet household needs.
126
  
This results in women having to borrow from local moneylenders in order 
to meet the initial repayments.  Another study found that 57% of weekly 
repayments were paid from sources other than investment profits, usually 
from loans from moneylenders or family members.
127
  Relying on local 
lenders that charge exorbitant interest rates places women further in debt
128
 
 
 118. Rahman, supra note 62, at 10. 
119.  ISLAM, supra note 10, at 152. 
120.  Jude Fernando, Nongovernmental Organizations, Micro-credit, and Empowerment  
of Women, 554 ANNALS 150, 171 (1997). 
 121. Taylor, supra note 98, at 329 (quoting Lawrence Solomon, Micro-Credit's Dark 
Underside; Problems of Bangladesh‟s Grameen Bank, WORLD PRESS REV., Aug. 1998, at 
33). 
 122. See Avery, supra note 69, at 229 (articulating the limitations of the weekly loan 
repayment system for microloans). 
 123. Taylor, supra note 98, at 329. 
 124. See Fernando, supra note 120, at 172 (1997) (discussing the limitations of 
microcredit, including the loan repayments that put pressure on women to make weekly 
repayments, often when they start their business and there is not much capital). 
 125. S.M. Rahman, A Practitioner‟s View of the Challenges Facing NGO-Based 
Microfinance in Bangladesh, in WHAT‟S WRONG WITH MICROFINANCE?, 193, 195 (Thomas 
Dichter and Malcolm Harper eds., 2007). 
 126. Rahman, supra note 62, at 182. 
 127. Id. at 183. 
 128. Id. at 5. 
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and makes them more vulnerable to trafficking.
129
 
There are a plethora of personal accounts of female microloan clients 
discussing the burden to make the weekly loan repayments.  One client 
stated that women are expected to work day and night for the “privilege of 
receiving small sums of credit,” and that the anxiety to repay under those 
conditions “drove women back to the more lucrative, albeit exploitative, 
sex industry.”
130
  Women consider the lack of flexibility in terms of loan 
repayment to be a heavy burden.  One woman who received a microloan 
explained that: 
We are constantly under pressure to think of ways in which we 
can raise money for weekly repayment requirements.  Often we 
have to sell the few home-grown vegetables that we earlier used 
for our own consumption, forgo buying books for our children 
and medical treatment.  Even if we try to give priority to these 
needs, our group members will make sure that we sell whatever 
we have in order to make the weekly repayment. . . .
131
 
The pressure to make immediate loan repayments is a serious 
limitation of microcredit that pushes many women to search for alternative 
sources of cash.
132
  Borrowers, especially in the group-lending situation, 
feel compelled to sell their own food and neglect their own family‟s needs 
so that they do not fall behind on paying back the microloan.  These 
women are desperate for an opportunity to receive instant access to cash, 
making them easy targets for traffickers. 
C. Cultural and gender limitations of microcredit 
Microloans are distributed in developing countries where gender and 
cultural norms discourage women from actively participating in the 
economic sector.  As a result, some women who receive microloans lose 
control of the loan to male members of their household.
133
  In one study, 
conducted by Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, it was found that a 
substantial portion of microloans given to women were directly invested by 
male relatives, while the women retained the liability for repayment.
134
  In 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Avery, supra note 69, at 231. 
 131. Fernando, supra note 120, at 174. 
 132. See Avery, supra note 69, at 229 (“Consequently, fledging microenterprise projects 
often require women to borrow additional funds from unscrupulous moneylenders and 
traders to pay off outstanding loans.”). 
 133. See generally Goetz & Gupta, supra note 100, at 49 (discussing the amount of 
control women have over the microloans). 
 134. See id. at 49 (suggesting that in most cases where microloans are given to women 
they do not retain control over how the loan is used but remain liable for loan repayments). 
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approximately 63% of the cases studied, the female recipients of the loans 
had partial, very limited, or no control over how the loan was used.
135
  This 
lack of control over how the loan is invested is problematic for women 
borrowers.  If a particular loan is squandered and yields no profit, the 
woman is still liable for the loan payments.  As a result, the woman is left 
to internalize the high cost of loaning to men
136
 and is forced to pursue 
outside economic opportunities to ensure that the loan is repaid. 
Research also indicates that women have experienced increased 
domestic violence and physical aggression from males in the household 
after receiving a microloan.
137
  In one study it was found that female 
borrowers commonly experienced domestic abuse as a result of their 
involvement with microloans.
138
  Among 120 women borrowers, 21 women 
(18% of the sample) found that there was a decrease in aggression and 
assault because of their involvement with the Grameen bank, 69 women 
(57%) saw a rise in verbal aggression, and 16 women (13%) saw a rise in 
both verbal and physical violence since they received their first loans.
139
  
Six borrowers encountered violence when they refused to give their loan to 
the male member of the household.
140
 
MFIs need to address these cultural and gender barriers in the 
communities where they disperse microloans.  The notion of women 
controlling loans subverts the traditional patriarchal hegemony of the 
household and, without support systems in place, women may lose control 
of the loan to the males of the house or be met with verbal and physical 
violence.
141
  The combination of poverty and abuse encourages women to 
seek refuge elsewhere, making them prime targets for traffickers. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are substantial limitations to the microcredit system that can 
have the perverse effect of increasing poverty among women and instances 
of trafficking.  This Section will discuss recommendations of how to 
correct the shortcomings of microcredit in order to create a system that 
reaches the poorest women, reduces the pressure to make loan repayments, 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. MICHELLE BELLESSA, THE EFFECTS OF MICROLENDING ON WOMEN‟S EMPOWERMENT 
IN BANGLADESH 16, available at 
http://marriottschool.byu.edu/emp/WPW/pdf/thirdworld/Small_Part_2.pdf. 
 137. Robin Isserles, Microcredit: The Rhetoric of Empowerment, the Reality of 
“Development As Usual”, 31 WOMEN‟S STUD. Q. 38, 49 (2003). 
 138. See Rahman, supra note 62, at 158 (arguing in part that violence against women is 
linked with the receipt of microloans). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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gives women more control over the loan, focuses on savings and education 
rather than just credit, is more sensitive to gender and cultural limitations, 
and collaborates with the state to maximize poverty reduction, eliminate 
corruption among government officials, and decrease instances of 
trafficking in women. 
A. MFIs need to reach the poorest women 
In order to reach the poorest women who are the most vulnerable to 
trafficking, MFIs need to rigorously target the poorest areas and further 
target the poorest clients within these local areas.
142
  One group that has 
made strides in providing access to credit is the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC), which targets the poorest of the poor, 
mainly female-headed, landless households.
143
  To receive membership into 
BRAC‟s Specially Targeted Ultra Poor (STUP) group at least three of the 
following criteria must be met:  (1) The household is dependent upon 
female domestic work or begging; (2) Ownership of less than 10 decimals, 
or one-tenth of an acre of land; (3) No active adult male members in the 
household; (4) Children of school–going age have to take paid work; and 
(5) No productive assets in the household.  BRAC provides food aid, 
employment, healthcare, skills training, compulsory savings, and ultimately 
microfinance.
144
  This program is subsidized and does not recuperate its 
financial costs.
145
  The lack of pressure to repay external donors, which 
encourages most other MFIs to ignore the poorest of the poor, is one 
explanation for BRAC‟s success.
146
  MFIs should implement a system 
similar to BRAC‟s STUP program and strive to provide financial assistance 
to the poorest women. 
MFIs should also be more flexible to allow for smaller loans to be 
taken out.  For the extremely poor who fear that they will not be able to 
meet the repayment requirements of a larger loan, a smaller loan would 
 
 142. Anton Simanowitz, Ensuring Impact: Reaching the Poorest While Building 
Financially Self-Sufficient Institutions, and Showing Improvement in the Lives of the 
Poorest Women and their Families, THE MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, 42 (Aug. 16, 
2002), http://www.microcreditsummit.org/papers/ensuringimpact.pdf. 
 143. ROY, supra note 112, at 114; see also Economic Development: Targeting Extreme 
Poverty, BANGL. RURAL ADVANCEMENT COMMITTEE (BRAC), 
http://www.brac.net/content/economic-development-targeting-extreme-poverty (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2010) (describing the BRAC programs devoted to reducing poverty in Bangladesh). 
 144. Targeting Extreme Poverty: Poverty Targeting, BRAC,  
http://www.brac.net/content/targeting-extreme-poverty-poverty-targeting (last visited Oct 
12, 2010). 
 145. ROY, supra note 112, at 114. 
 146. Id. 
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provide them with less risk.
147
  There should be no floor to the loan amount 
in order to maximize the number of poor clients that can be reached by 
microcredit.
148
 
Furthermore, in order to assist those most in need of microcredit, the 
MFIs should try to lower the interest rates on the loans.  Although the 
interest rates offered by MFIs are lower than those offered by local 
moneylenders, most still exceed 20%.
149
  Some strategies for decreasing 
interest rates include “reducing transaction costs, push[ing] for high 
growth, high repayments and portfolio turnover.”
150
  Lowering interest rates 
would encourage those that are extremely poor, and thus averse to 
obtaining loans with high interest rates, to take out microloans.  This would 
result in more customers for MFIs, potentially offsetting the cost of 
decreasing the interest rates for the microloan.  Even if decreased interest 
rates make MFIs less profitable, it would help them achieve a more 
important societal goal:  alleviating poverty and diminishing the rates of 
trafficking in women.   
B. MFIs need to be more flexible with loan repayments 
A weekly loan repayment is unrealistic for many borrowers, especially 
when first starting a business where capital has not yet been generated.
151
  
Biweekly or monthly repayment options would put much less pressure on 
women to have to borrow from local lenders, or to seek other economic 
prospects in order to ensure timely repayment. 
MFIs should also be attuned to environmental conditions that may 
affect loan repayment.
152
  For example, in Mali it is very difficult to make 
loan repayments during the rainy season.
153  
Requiring loan repayment 
during these months has led to a high rate of attrition from microcredit 
programs.
154
  MFIs must be sensitive to these environmental issues, which 
vary from country to country, so that borrowers are not left to make loan 
 
 147. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 162.  
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 152 (using the Grameen Bank as a case study and pointing out that 
effective rates of interest on loans issued by the bank exceed 20%). 
 150. Id. at 166. 
 151. Avery, supra note 69, at 229. 
 152. See ANASTASE NTEZIYAREMYE & BARBARA MKNELLY, FREEDOM FROM HUNGER, 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 7: MALI POVERTY OUTREACH STUDY OF THE KAFO JIGINEW AND 
NYESIGISO CREDIT AND SAVINGS WITH EDUCATION PROGRAMS 62 (2001), available at 
http://www.ffhtechnical.org/resources/research-reports/mali-poverty-outreach-study-kafo-
jiginew-and-ny-sigiso-credit-and-savings (arguing for flexibility in repayment plans during 
the rainy season). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 63. 
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repayments during a period of time where profits are almost impossible to 
yield. 
The Grameen Bank has implemented a more flexible lending option 
called “flexi-loan detour,” a way of “exiting the loan highway” and 
returning several months later when repayment difficulties arise.
155
  
Unfortunately, this “flexible” system is rife with disincentives for 
borrowers to actually use this “detour,” particularly given the fact that once 
a borrower exits the “loan highway” the loan ceiling that she built up over 
the past years is wiped out.
156
  Despite these limitations, it is a positive sign 
that lenders are becoming aware that more flexibility is needed in order for 
microcredit to serve the poorest women. 
C. MFIs should create saving systems, not just give credit 
Most MFIs have focused their efforts solely on extending credit to the 
poor.  However, this “credit-alone approach” is not helpful for alleviating 
poverty, especially among the extremely poor.
157
  Commentators have 
described savings as the “forgotten half” of the MFIs‟ involvement in 
extending microloans in developing countries.
158
  Scholars suggest that 
savings systems may result in the inclusion of the poorest 10-15% of the 
population, who are risk averse
159
 and thus less likely to “experiment with 
new ideas or invest money in businesses that involve taking risks.”
160
 
In contrast to the rigid repayment requirements of microloans and the 
fact that borrowers must pay interest on loans, savings systems offer 
flexibility and the potential for earning interest.
161
  Research indicates that 
poor clients are often able to save significant capital, and that they “value 
safe and convenient savings facilities.”
162
  This access to savings can help 
the poor “smooth consumption over periods of cyclical or unexpected 
crisis, thus greatly improving their economic security.”
163
  Providing poor 
women with a safety net to assist them during difficult economic times will 
decrease their susceptibility to trafficking because they will not be in dire 
need to have immediate access to capital. 
 
 155. ROY, supra note 112, at 110. 
 156. Id. at 118. 
 157. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 153. 
 158. Paul B. McGuire & John D. Conroy, The Microfinance Phenomenon, 7 ASIA-PAC. 
REV. 90, 97 (2000). 
 159. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 154. 
 160. Khan, supra note 58, at 151. 
 161. REBECCA M. VONDERLACK & MARK SCHREINER, CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., WOMEN, 
MICROFINANCE, AND SAVINGS: LESSONS AND PROPOSALS 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Women_Microfinance_and_Savings.pdf. 
 162. McGuire & Conroy, supra note 158, at 97. 
 163. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 153. 
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There are both informal and formal types of savings systems that can 
be implemented in areas where microloans are distributed.  Informal 
savings systems include annual savings clubs, which are organized by 
religious groups and social clubs, and allow members to make deposits of 
any amount at each club meeting.
164
  These clubs do not give interest on the 
savings but do provide a means for members to easily save money.
165
  
Another type of informal saving system is a Rotating Savings and Credit 
Association (ROSCA), which is a “group of individuals who come together 
and make regular cyclical contributions to a common fund, which is then 
given as a lump sum to one member.”
166
  This cycle continues until each 
member has received a lump sum of the savings from the fund.
167
  The 
advantage of ROSCA is that it “facilitates the availability of a lump sum of 
money, which allows for higher investment to be made earlier than 
accumulation of savings.”
168
  These types of informal savings are beneficial 
because they allow individuals to build up savings at low transaction 
costs.
169
  However, there is the potential for abuse in both informal savings 
models.  For example, in the savings club there is the risk that the funds 
will be embezzled, wiping out all of the savings that members have accrued 
over time.
170
  In a ROSCA, it is possible that an individual who has already 
received a lump sum from the fund will no longer want to make 
contributions to the pool.
171
  Furthermore, these savings systems do not 
provide the interest that formal services provide.
172
 
Formal savings programs can include banks offering savings accounts 
with a positive rate of interest, no minimum deposit or balance, and 
immediate access to withdrawals.
173
  There are also MFIs, including 
SafeSave, that offer flexible savings programs to their clients.
174
  SafeSave 
hires door-to-door collectors to visit clients daily, and clients can either 
make a deposit or request to make a withdrawal.
175
  This program provides 
the stability of a formal savings institution and allows members to earn 
interest on their savings.
176
  There are also banks in Ghana and Mexico that 
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169.  VONDERLACK & SCHREINER, supra note 161, at 7. 
170.  Id.  
171.  Id. at 9. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. at 11-12. 
174.  Id. at 11. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
DRISCOLLFINALIZED_SIX 1/5/2011  10:29 PM 
296 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
have formalized the ROSCA system, making members of the group sign 
contracts that offer financial incentives for regular, fixed deposits.
177
  In 
comparison to the informal ROSCA model, this formal ROSCA system 
pays interest and provides more stability by requiring all group members to 
sign a contract that binds them to fulfill specific duties and obligations.
178
 
D. MFIs need to educate women and help them develop business skills 
Empirical studies indicate that microcredit loans coupled with training 
programs have a higher probability of success, particularly with women.
179
  
For example, in interviews with women who received loans from Sinapi 
Aba Trust, most recipients commented that their ability to plan, project 
profit, and manage money had improved substantially as a result of the 
training they received from their orientation and Trust Bank meetings.
180
 
Asociación para el Desarrollo Microempresarial Colombiano 
(ADEMCOL) is another example of an MFI that offers, “holistic client 
transformation by combining efficient delivery of financial services with 
social interventions such as training, leadership development, and 
development of business and social networks.”
181
  ADEMCOL has had 
positive results, finding that training has not only led to more profitable 
businesses, but has also empowered women.
182
  This empowerment is seen 
in the comments of Gladis Lenis de Gonzales, a shoemaker and 
ADEMCOL client, who remarked:  “After having received the training, I 
have had changes in both my business and my personal life.  Intellectually, 
I feel that my life has been reactivated, because studying, calculating, and 
analyzing again have made me feel useful. . . .”
183
  Therefore, integrating 
business training with microloan distribution could be beneficial for 
optimizing business profits, while empowering women at the same time. 
In addition to basic business training, women‟s education and literacy 
are important.  MFIs have cited illiteracy as “a major stumbling block for 
their clients.”
184
  Although MFIs have largely steered away from 
implementing literacy programs because they require a significant output of 
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 180. Cheston & Kuhn, supra note 88, at 39. 
 181. ASOCIACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO MICROEMPRESARIAL COLOMBIANO (ADEMCOL) 
& WOMEN‟S OPPORTUNITY FUND, BUNDLING MICROFINANCE AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
SERVICES (BDS): A CASE STUDY FROM ADEMCOL IN COLOMBIA 7 (2001), available at 
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=7294_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
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has led to the implementation of a number of empowering community programs). 
 183. Id. at vii. 
 184. Cheston & Kuhn, supra note 88, at 41. 
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time and resources, there are some inexpensive ways that MFIs can 
implement literacy training, including providing materials to women in the 
lending groups to train themselves.
185
  The Women‟s Empowerment Project 
(WEP) has used this low-cost method of training women and found that the 
literacy rate of its members rose from 21% to 85% during the first thirty 
months of the program.
186
 
Increased education among women would expand the possible 
microenterprises available for them to explore.  With low levels of skill and 
knowledge, women often have to create businesses that have low growth 
potential.
187
  Assisting women design more complicated and high growth 
potential businesses will help reduce poverty long-term and give them 
financial stability so that they will not feel pressured to seek economic 
prospects abroad and expose themselves to a potential trafficking 
situation.
188
 
E. MFIs need to be attuned to cultural and gender issues 
It is also important that MFIs support women who are balancing 
responsibilities at home with maintaining their businesses.  For example, 
MFIs can hold forums in the lending centers where women can discuss 
issues such as balancing family life with operating a business.  These 
forums have great potential because these economically empowered 
women can begin to take steps to address the cultural and legal barriers that 
limit their social and political power.
189
  The few MFIs that have started to 
implement these forums have found that “women have greater knowledge 
of their civil and legal rights and are more aware of their position and the 
choices they can make.”
190
 
 MFIs are also beginning to implement outreach efforts to include 
husbands in the microloan process.  If the husband feels included, he may 
be more likely to provide the necessary support for his wife so that she can 
fulfill her multiple roles.
191
  Empirical data demonstrates that the “most 
successful clients of many MFIs are the ones who have the most supportive 
husbands and that those with more problems often have problems with their 
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 188. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 157 (noting that without high growth project support 
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husbands.”
192
  By including the husband in the microloan process, he may 
be more supportive of his wife‟s involvement with microcredit. 
Finally, there must be more surveillance over how the loan is utilized 
to make sure that women are maintaining control over the microloan.  
Certain safeguards could be put in place, including requiring borrowers to 
provide detailed accounts of loan use.
193
  At the very least, MFIs should 
require a contract between the woman and the actual user of the loan
194
 to 
protect her from being held liable for failure to make loan repayments. 
F. MFIs should work with local governments to maximize poverty 
reduction and deter trafficking 
Scholars have found that there is a significant divide between MFIs 
and the local governments of the countries where the loans are dispersed.
195
  
As discussed earlier, these local governments have played an important role 
in perpetuating trafficking because they reap economic profits from 
traffickers.
196
  Therefore, it is crucial that MFIs try to collaborate with local 
governments to eliminate the corruption, and to work in tandem to meet the 
goals of alleviating poverty and deterring trafficking.  It is unclear how 
much collaboration is actually feasible between the local government and 
the MFIs.  The fact that MFIs are “outsiders” suggests that they may be 
viewed as an intrusion rather than an asset to the local community and may 
disrupt traditional social (especially gender) relations.
197
  Furthermore, the 
economic profits that local governments receive from trafficking may 
outweigh the benefits that result from partnerships with MFIs.  However, 
collaboration between local governments and MFIs can have a synergistic 
effect in alleviating poverty and trafficking in women that is worth 
pursuing in spite of the costs. 
For MFIs, working with local governments would help create a more 
particularized credit program that would be especially sensitive to the 
cultural, political, religious, and economic issues specific to that country.
198
  
Furthermore, collaboration could increase women‟s empowerment in the 
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community.  Many of these countries are hierarchical and patriarchal.
199
  
Microcredit programs that focus on extending credit to women could direct 
the country‟s attention to the need to provide assistance to this group
200
 and 
show that women are successful at creating businesses and making loan 
repayments.  This could enhance the overall status of women in these 
countries.
201
 
MFIs could also work with local governments in a joint effort to 
eliminate corruption among government officials who enable trafficking in 
the community.  Increasing surveillance of government officials to ensure 
that they are not participating in trafficking is necessary.  Collaborating 
with the government to increase penalties for officials who assist traffickers 
would also act as a deterrent. 
Local governments would also benefit from collaboration with MFIs.  
One goal of local governments is to provide social welfare and reduce 
poverty.
202
  These communities are often poor and have limited economic 
resources to help supplement their poor populations.  However, by teaming 
up with MFIs that have financial backing and access to cash, they can 
maximize poverty reduction by ensuring that capital is being inserted into 
the poorest areas of the country.
203
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Microcredit could be instrumental in decreasing the rate of trafficking 
in women.  If microcredit can succeed in helping women rise out of 
poverty, they are less likely to seek economic opportunities abroad and thus 
less likely to become victims of trafficking.  However, microcredit, in its 
current form, actually perpetuates the cycle of poverty and increases 
women‟s vulnerability to trafficking. 
A significant overhaul of the microcredit system is necessary in order 
for it to effectively combat the global human trafficking epidemic.  
Unfortunately, many MFIs receive their funds from private donors and face 
external pressure to ensure that the loans are repaid on time and that the 
MFI is profitable.  For microcredit to be successful in diminishing the rates 
of trafficking in women, MFIs need to pair flexible microloans with non-
financial services for women, including educational opportunities and 
assistance in overcoming cultural and gender barriers.  Furthermore, the 
MFIs need to maintain an ethos of poverty-focused development rather 
than wealth production in order for microcredit to successfully alleviate 
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poverty and diminish the rates of trafficking in women. 
